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‘Europe’s future does not lie in ideologies or institutions, or in Treaties 
or charters of various enumerated ‘rights’... Europe’s future lies in the politi-
cal imagination; in its ability to think rather more of the ‘human’ and rather 
less of the ‘rights’; rather more of liberty and rather less of ‘democracy’; ra-
ther more of equality and rather less of the ‘rule of law’…’ 
I. Ward, Beyond Constitutionalism.  
The Search for a European political imagination,  
(2001) 7 E.L.J. 24, 39-40 
I. Introduction 
Observers of the Europeanisation of Private law and initiatives aimed at the 
codification of the emergent body of EU Private law have been faced with con-
tradictory developments in recent months: whilst the European Council has 
sought to halt the process of codification whilst supporting the goal of acquis 
modernisation,1 the European Parliament has sought to reinvigorate precisely 
those initiatives aimed at codification.2 This has left two research groups 
charged with elaborating, respectively, a Common Frame of Reference or CFR 
(Joint Network) and improving the acquis communautaire (Acquis Group).3 
Whilst the Acquis Group is also a member of the Joint Network, these groups 
operate under the auspices, respectively, of DG Health and Consumer Affairs 
                                                 
1  2694th Council Meeting, Brussels 28-29 November 2005, Press Release 14155/05 
(Presse 287) at 7 and 10 at 28: The Council recognised the ‘unique opportunity af-
forded by the proposed review and the introduction of the Unfair Commercial Prac-
tices Directive to update and modernise the consumer acquis’ and welcomed: ‘The 
Commission’s repeated reassurance that it does not intend to propose a ‘European 
Civil Code’ which would harmonise contract laws of Member States...” 
<http://ue.eu.int/ue > At 28-29, inviting the Commission: ‘to come forward… with a 
timetable, a detailed description of the process, and proposals for updating and mod-
ernizing the Consumer Acquis and also to reprioritize accordingly the work on the 
CFR.’ 
2  European Parliament Resolution on European contract law and the revision of the 
acquis: the way forward, (2005/2022(INI)) available at:  
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu. The European Parliament reiterated: ‘its convic-
tion... that a uniform internal market cannot be fully functional without further steps 
towards the harmonisation of civil law.’ It went on to call ‘on the Commission to 
exploit straightaway the ongoing work by the research groups on the drafting of 
European contract law, and by the Network for a CFR, with a view to using their re-
sults firstly towards the revision of the acquis in the field of civil law, and subse-
quently towards developing a system of Community civil law.’ 
3  Acquis Group: http://www.acquis-group.org. 
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and DG Internal Market. Meanwhile, yet another dimension to this initiative is 
apparent in the Commission’s latest 2007 Green Paper on Acquis Revision 
(2007 Green Paper) in which the Commission appears to suggest (1) that the 
project should be limited initially to the province of EC Consumer law; (2) that 
there are alternatives to the Joint Network and Acquis Group; (3) that an ap-
proach be adopted centred on a broad framework instrument accompanied by 
selective vertical action.4  
These developments suggest that whilst a new ‘global player’ has entered 
private law discourse, the basic character of the Commission’s initiative, even 
as we go into the fourth round of consultations, is by far from settled. Quite 
apart from the lack of clarity which accompanies the precise nature of the Op-
tional Instrument (OI) and the Common Frame of Reference (CFR), the 
‘framework instrument’ and ‘selective vertical action’, the idea of codification 
seems fundamentally incompatible with the goal of upholding freedom of con-
tract. The EC legal order has always been predicated upon pragmatic effet utile 
case law, a plurality of legal sources and a competition of legal orders, rather 
than any legal Codes, Instruments or Frames of Reference imposed from on 
high. Emblematic of the confusion surrounding the initiative and highlighted in 
the 2007 Green Paper is the contested status of EC Consumer law, leaving 
even the chief architect of the Commission’s initiative Dirk Staudenmayer in a 
quandary as to whether Consumer law can be included in an OI or serve as the 
centrepiece of the CFR.5 Equally, Norbert Reich asks whether Consumer law 
can usefully serve as the cornerstone of EC Contract law, or will serve, rather, 
as the nucleus for the deeper codification of European Contract law, proving a 
Trojan horse in an altogether more profound exercise.6 On the basis of the 
most recent indications from the working groups either of these scenarios 
seems possible, with the question of consolidation in the Consumer law acquis 
taking centre stage. On 18 December 2006 the Acquis Group presented its 
compendium of EC consumer law, alongside the compendium, the Acquis 
                                                 
4  2007 Green Paper on the Consumer Acquis, COM (2006) 744 final. of 08.02.2007 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int. 
5  D. Staudenmayer, The Place of Consumer Law within the process on European Con-
tract law, (2004) J. Consumer Policy 269 at pp.275-279.  
6  N. Reich, A CFR – Ghost or Host for Integration, ZERP DP 7/06 (2006), (English 
version: A European Contract Law or an EU Contract Law Regulation for Consum-
ers, (2005) 28 J Consumer Policy 383). N. Reich, Die Stellung des Verbraucher-
schutzes im “Gemeinsamen Referenzrahmen” und im “optionellen Instrument” – 
Trojanisches Pferd oder Kinderschreck? Droit de la consommation / Konsumenten-
schutzrecht / Consumer law, Liber Amicorum Bernd Stauder, (eds. L. Thevenoz & 
N. Reich) at 357-382 (Zürich: Schulthess, 2006).  
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Group has produced a 795 page comparative analysis (2006 Report).7  On 8 
February 2007 the Commission presented its Green Paper on the Consumer 
Acquis, a paper predating (COM (2006) 744 final) and hence, unsurprisingly, 
failing to refer to the 2006 Report.  
This paper seeks an evaluation of the state of play in this ‘greater coher-
ence’ initiative, describing the problems associated with the EC’s diverse ac-
quis (Part II) in the light of the positions adopted by Council, Parliament and 
Commission. To this end the initiative is placed in a context characterised by 
polycentricity in ‘Europeanised’ private law. In the course of this analysis, the 
initiatives aimed at improving coherence are analysed. This propels us into a 
discussion of the sometimes paradoxical impact of measures of harmonisation 
and codification. Attention then turns to policy elaboration (Part III) and an 
evaluation of both the process and the current options (Part IV). Particular at-
tention is given to the institutional dynamics of the process: the Commission’s 
role, the Parliament’s advocacy of codification and the Council’s rejection of a 
Code. 
II. The Trouble with the Acquis 
The steadily expanding body of selective, haphazard, contradictory, uneven, 
diversely drafted and transposed EC secondary law bears the danger of legal 
fragmentation. The EC has always instrumentalised contract as a simple means 
to complex ends: using contract law to achieve goals in competition, free 
movement, consumer protection, public procurement, non-discrimination. EC 
Contract law is thus a functional rather than systematic body of law, developed 
piece by piece from the bottom-up to solve practical problems, rather than 
from the top down to create a coherent body of law.8 Set against this back-
ground the case for a more coherence in European private law may seem irre-
sistible.9 Simultaneously, codification discourse raises important governance 
                                                 
7  Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int.  
8  N. Reich, cited above note 6, at p.30: ‘EU law looks at the concept of contract from 
a functional side, in order to determine its sphere of application in promoting free 
movement, competition, or adequate standards in consumer law… The concept of 
contract cannot be seen in isolation but rather by its function in a particular field... It 
may vary from one subject to another.’ 
9  C. von Bar, From Principles to Codification: Prospects for European Private law, 
(2002) 8 C.J.E.L. 379. O. Lando, Does the European Union need a Civil Code, 
(2003) 49 RIW 1. 
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issues,10 and provides a valuable insight into how policy is elaborated within 
the European institutional matrix. 
The controversy surrounding the codification proposals is not limited to 
their German origins.11 While no one would question the need to improve sec-
ondary law, or for greater transparency in its transposition, or an expansion of 
the work on comparative analysis, the elaboration of a Civil Code on an inter-
nal market basis would represent a more controversial step.12 While Basedow 
has argued that creating uniform conditions for marketing across the EU, 
avoiding the risks associated with the application of foreign law and the reduc-
tion of transaction costs could bring codification measures within the remit of 
the EU’s internal market competence,13  this position is untenable in the light 
of Tobacco Advertising: where it was held that harmonisation measures 
adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC14 must genuinely contribute to the estab-
lishment and functioning of the internal market.15 Tobacco Advertising and the 
                                                 
10  Constitutional implications: A. Colombi Ciacchi, Der Aktionsplan der Kommission 
für ein kohärenteres Vertragsrecht: Wo bleibt die Rückbindung an die Europäische 
Verfassung? (2004) Jb.J.ZivRWiss 151 (Stuttgart, Boorberg, 2005). S. Weatherill, 
Why Object to the Harmonisation of Private Law by the EC?, (2004) 5 E.R.P.L. 
633. H. Schepel, The Enforcement of EC Law in Contractual Relations: Case Stud-
ies in How Not to ‘Constitutionalize’ Private Law, (2004) 5 E.R.P.L. 661. 
11 G. Beitzke, Probleme der Privatrechtsangleichung in der Europäischen Wirtschafts-
gemeinschaft, (1964) ZfRV 80; C. Hauschka, Grundprobleme der Privatrechtsfort-
bildung durch die EWG, (1990) 45 JZ 521; P. Hommelhoff, Zivilrecht unter dem 
Einfluss europäischer Rechtsangleichung, (1992) 192 AcP 71; P. Ulmer, Vom deut-
schen zum europäischen Privatrecht?, (1992) 47 JZ 1; F. Rittner, Das Gemein-
schaftsprivatrecht und die europäische Integration, 50 JZ 849 (1995); E. Steindorf, 
EG-Vertrag und Privatrecht, (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1996), O. Remien, Ansätze für 
ein Europäisches Vertragsrecht, (1988) 87 ZVglRWiss 105. Generally: C. Joerges & 
G. Brüggemeier, Europäisierung des Vertrags-und Haftungsrechts, in Gemeinsames 
Privatrecht in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (P-C. Müller-Graff ed.,) (Baden-
Baden, Nomos, 1999) (Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration, Bd. 33) (2d ed. 1999, 
301-360). 
12  R. Schulze, Grundsätze des Vertragsschlusses im Acquis Communautaire (2005) 
GPR 56. 
13  J. Basedow, A Common Contract Law for the Common Market, (1996) 33 
C.M.L.Rev. 1169. 
14  Article 95 EC provides: "… [T]he Council shall… adopt the measures for the ap-
proximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action 
in Member States which have as their object the establishment of the internal mar-
ket." (author’s emphasis). 
15  Case C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising), [2000] 
E.C.R. I-8419, on the use of Article 95 EC at 84 ‘If a mere finding of disparities be-
tween national rules and of the abstract risk of obstacles to the exercise of funda-
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subsequent case-law, notably Swedish Match, questioned EC competence to 
legislate in contract and consumer law, let alone in private law more gener-
ally.16 Additionally, the EC aims of protecting national identity as well as the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality support the proposition that im-
posing any uniform private law is a task which, in the absence of a Treaty revi-
sion, is outside the Treaty’s remit.  
Nevertheless, in both its 2004 Communication on European Contract law 
(2004 Communication)17 and 2005 Progress Report on European Contract law 
(2005 Progress Report)18, despite denying any intent to introduce a Civil Code, 
the Commission sought to generate support for a written, though ‘flexible and 
efficient’ EC Contract law.19 Similarly paradoxical is that these ‘non-Code’ 
measures were to be developed by a consortium, the Joint Network on Euro-
pean Private law (Joint Network), led by the Study Group on a European Civil 
Code (Study Group).20 The European Council preemptively rubber-stamped 
                                                                                                                                                     
mental freedoms or of distortions of competition… were sufficient to justify the 
choice of Art.100a as a legal basis, judicial review of compliance with the proper le-
gal basis might be rendered nugatory.’ 
16  C-210/03 R v Secretary of State for Health (Swedish Match), [2000] ECR I-11893 
paras. 26, 30-32, 34 and 68. S. Weatherill, Why object to the Harmonisation of Pri-
vate law by the EC, (2004) 12 E.R.P.L. 633 at 646: ‘the demise of the political as-
sumption that the EC possesses a competence carte blanche to harmonise laws may 
clear the way to a more explicit and constructive focus on what really is needed of a 
programme of harmonisation in the modern EU… the context has altered. Centrali-
sation is under fire. Harmonisation has become a more constitutionally contested 
process.’ S. Weatherill, The Constitutional Competence of the EU to deliver Social 
Justice, (2006) 2 E.R.C.L. 136. 
17  2004 Communication on European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: 
the way forward, COM (2004) 651 final (Oct. 11, 2004):  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers.  
18  Commission’s 1st Annual Progress Report on Contract Law and Acquis Review, 
COM (2005) 456 final. Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int. 
19  2004 Communication, Cited above note 17. The Commission is at once against a 
Code, and for non-sector-specific measures and of flexible and efficient solutions(!): 
Point 2.3. at 8, 1: ‘The Action Plan concluded... that at this stage there were no indi-
cations that the sectoral approach followed thus far leads to problems or that it 
should be abandoned. It was nevertheless considered appropriate to examine 
whether non-sector-specific measures such as an OI may be required.’ 3. ‘Although 
it is premature to speculate about the possible outcome of the reflection, it is impor-
tant to explain that it is neither the Commission’s intention to propose a „European 
Civil Code“ ... nor should the reflections be seen as in any way calling into question 
the current approaches to promoting free circulation on the basis of flexible and effi-
cient solutions.’ 
20  Respectively: http://www.sgecc.net and http://www.elsi.uos.de. 
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the central measure of the 2004 Communication, the CFR, at the Brussels’ 
Summit in November 2004.21 CFR Consultations began immediately,22 and a 
reflection group of 160 stakeholders (CFR-Net) first met on 15 December 
2004.23  
Debate on the need for a Civil Code is complex: what begins as a ‘simple’ 
search for coherence tends to develop into an evermore uncertain exercise. 
Similarly, the inconsistent use of terminology, the complex reality of inter-
woven laws of contracts and the unresolved boundary between Contract and 
Private law injects imprecision into the debate. This is compounded by the 
Commission’s desire to keep all of its options open; and the continuing lack of 
clarity surrounding those options; options obscured rather than clarified in the 
successive rounds of policy deliberation.24 Meanwhile, the terms of debate are 
weighted: proponents of codification appeal to a positive picture of visionary 
coherence; whilst opponents have to make the more difficult case for the op-
eration of a number of valid and conflicting norms. Precisely because of these 
difficulties, this paper begins by describing the trouble with the acquis. 
A. Pluralism, diagonal conflicts and Sui generis EC law 
The opportuneness of codification can be assessed by reference to the com-
patibility of codification with EC law as it stands. Here again, debate has been 
shaped by German contributions.25 Initially, German Ordoliberals hoped EC 
                                                 
21  Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Brussels II (Nov. 4-5 2004), Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice: The Hague Programme, Annex I (14292/1/04). Point 
3.4.4., Ensuring coherence and upgrading the quality of EU legislation, 29. 
<http://ue.eu.int/ue>. 
22  Member State experts first met on 3 December 2004, again on 31 May 2005: Work-
shop of the Network of Member State Experts on European Contract Law (Brussels, 
May 31, 2005): <http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int.> 
23 Available at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/> 
24  i.e. Commission’s assertion that it is not bound to the findings of the reflection proc-
ess: 2004 Communication, Cited above note 17, point 3.2.1 at 12. 
25 M. Franzen, Privatrechtsangleichung durch die Europäische Gemeinschaft (Berlin, 
de Gruyter, 1999); M. Gebauer, Europäisches Schuldvertragsrecht, (Heidelberg, U-
niversitätsverlag C. Winter 1998); S. Grundmann, Europäisches Schuldvertrags-
recht: Das Europäische Recht der Unternehmensgeschäfte (Berlin, de Gruyter, 
1999); I. Klauer, Die Europäisierung des Privatrechts – Der EuGH als Zivilrichter 
(Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1998); B. Lurger, Grundfragen der Vereinheitlichung des 
Vertragrechts in der Europäischen Union (Vienna, Springer, 2002); C. Joerges & G. 
Brüggemeier, Europäisierung des Vertrags- und Haftungsrechts, cited above note 3; 
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law would erode market-partitioning national laws through (1) an application 
of the four freedoms, (2) a competition of legal orders and (3) a program of 
negative integration.26 From this perspective, the Treaties constituted an Eco-
nomic Constitution (Wirtschaftsverfassung), such that elaborating any policy 
outside the Economic was illegitimate.27 Ordoliberals were sceptical of EC 
law-making, this made their conversion to codification so striking:28 faced with 
‘creeping approximation’ ordoliberals decided that only codification could 
halt the (undesired) tide of EC law permeating the (desired) sphere of national 
law. Codification was seen as an instrument by which both archaic provisions 
of domestic law and national measures of upward derogation could be under-
mined.29 This position ignores the Treaty revisions, while implying that all 
measures of upward derogation are simply illegitimate.30 Yet the Court of Jus-
tice, rather than applying ordoliberal orthodoxy, has sought to elaborate prag-
matic solutions in its case-law. In Gaston Schul, the Court adopting a policy of 
developing market conditions that approximate to those of a single market.31 
Meanwhile, integration is not simply about eliminating difference; it is about 
                                                                                                                                                     
K. Riesenhuber, Systeme und Prinzipien des Europäischen Vertragsrechts (Berlin, 
de Gruyter, 2003). 
26  ‘Ordoliberalism’ describes the relations between the public and private in terms of 
an economic constitution. D.J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century 
Europe, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1998). W. Sauter, The Economic Constitution of the 
EU, (1998) 4 C.J.E.L. 27; D.J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German 
Neo-liberalism, Competition law and the ‘New’ Europe, (1994) 42 Am J. Comp. L. 
25; N. Reich, Europe’s Economic Constitution, or: A New Look at Keck, (1999) 19 
O.J.L.S. 337. 
27  U. Immenga, Wettbewerbspolitik contra Industriepolitik nach Maastricht, (1994) 
EuZW 14. 
28  W. Hallstein, Angleichung des Privat- und Prozessrechts in der Europäischen Wirt-
schaftsgemeinschaft, (1964) 28 RabelsZ 211. Original scepticism at 215: ‘With 
every new law... it becomes more difficult for Judge, Civil Servant, Lawyer… busi-
nessman to maintain an understanding of the law even in specific areas…’ (author’s 
translation). 
29  Case 15/81, Gaston Schul, [1982] E.C.R. 1409, 33. Confirmed: Case 299/86, Crimi-
nal Proceedings Against Rainer Drexl, [1988] E.C.R. 1213, 24. 
30  W. Sauter, cited above note 26, at 56. Activism: H. Rasmussen, Between Self-
Restraint and Activism: A Judicial Policy for the European Court, (1988) 13 
E.L.Rev. 28; M. Cappelletti, Is the Court of Justice Running Wild? (1987) 12 
E.L.Rev. 199. W.P.J. Wils, The Search for a Rule in Article 30 EEC: Much Ado 
About Nothing? (1993) 18 E.L.Rev. 475. 
31  Case 15/81, Gaston Schul, [1982] E.C.R. 1409, 32-34. 
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reconciling positions and developing a workable community of law.32 The 
conviction that written law constitutes a golden path to legal unity is discred-
ited by the legal process of European integration itself.33 
Pluralistic conceptions are more helpful in assessing the potential of codifi-
cation; of a law empowering citizens to challenge national laws, without plac-
ing them under allegiance duties.34 Furthermore, EC private law has always 
been law sui generis; functionally oriented law, leaving much to be determined 
by reference to provisions of national law.  Equally the Community is not all 
powerful, it is subject to checks and balances: here it should be recalled that in 
the absence of a Treaty revision, Community institutions are bound by their 
enumerated powers; that contract law codification remains outside the scope of 
those powers, and that contract law remains a genuine matter for the Member 
States. Moreover, primary EC law has always been predicated upon the auton-
omy of economic actors and a competition of legal orders; a competition which 
is enhanced with the need to transpose secondary law in order to ensure its ef-
fective application. This view of EC law is lent credence in the justifications 
between principles of EC and national law, drawn ‘diagonally’ from different 
areas. Through the case-law a matrix of diagonal conflicts can be constructed 
(e.g. between national unfair trading rules vs. EC competition law in VAG 
Händlerbeirat; or between national company rules vs. EC establishment rights 
in Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art).35 EC law has thus emerged as a di-
agonal conflicts’ law charged with (1) ensuring the compatibility of national 
and EC law,36 (2) managing a contested legal order.37 This pragmatic under-
standing of EC law concludes that EC law neither sponsors unlimited regula-
                                                 
32  Cases C-267 and 268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard, 
[1993] E.C.R. I-6097. 
33  H. Kötz, Rechtsvergelichung und gemeineuropäisches Privatrecht, in Gemeinsames 
Privatrecht in der EG (Müller-Graff ed., Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1993). 
34  N. Reich, Union Citizenship - Metaphor or Source of Rights? (2001) 7 E.L.J. 4 at 20. 
35  Exemplified: Case C-41/96, VAG Händlerbeirat v. SYD-Consult [1997] E.C.R. I-
3123, 16 (unfair trading vs. EC competition); Case C-212/97, Centros v. Erhvervs-
og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] E.C.R. I-1459; Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nor-
dic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH [2002] E.C.R. I-9919; Case C-
167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd. 
[2003] E.C.R. I-10155 (company registration vs. EC establishment rights). 
36  R. Wesseling, The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of E.C. Antitrust 
Law: Unspoken Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options, 
(1999) 20 E.C.L.R. 420 at 429-430. 
37  Z. Bañkowski & E. Christodoulidis, The European Union as an Essentially Con-
tested Project, (1998) 4 E.L.J. 341, 345-47. 
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tory competition nor rings the death knell of state intervention.38 At least tradi-
tionally, ‘minimum harmonisation’ has been the device by which Member 
States have been allowed to adopt more protective rules than provided in 
Community secondary law.39 The quality of integration lies in this competition 
amongst the claims of simultaneously valid legal orders. It lies in reciprocity 
rather than in the validity claims of a unitary law. Adopting this pluralistic 
conception significantly reduces the necessity of codification. 
B. Interlegality: the character of the Acquis 
The emergent acquis has ‘Europeanised’ national private law since the early 
eighties. This ‘Europeanisation’ occurred directly, in consumer protection and 
company law, and indirectly, via block exemptions, in competition law,40 and 
it occurred broadly in the EC policy fields.41 Yet this is not the full picture; 
                                                 
38  C. Joerges, Zur Legitimität der Europäisierung des Privatrechts: Überlegungen zu ei-
nem Recht-Fertigungs-Recht für das Mehrebenensystem der EU, in Rechtsverfas-
sungsrecht 183, 212 (C. Joerges & G. Teubner eds., Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2003); 
English version: <http://www.iue.it/PUB/law03-3.pdf.> Id. at 21. Company law cases: 
Case C-212/97, Centros, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459 and Case C-208/00, Überseering BV, 
[2002] E.C.R. I-9919; Distribution agreements: Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris, 
[1986] E.C.R. 353; Case C-453/99, Courage v Crehan, [2001] E.C.R. I-6297; Consu-
mer Protection: Joint Cases C-240-244/98, Grupo Editorial Océano SA, 2000 E.C.R. 
I-4941; Case C-52/00, Commission v. France, [2002] E.C.R. I-3827; Case C-154/00, 
Commission v Greece, [2002] E.C.R. I-3879; Case C-183/00, Sanchez v. Medicina 
Asturiana SA, [2002] E.C.R. I-3901. C. Joerges, Rethinking European Law’s Suprem-
acy, European University Institute, EUI Working Paper Law No. 2005/12. C. Joerges, 
On the Legitimacy of Europeanising Europe’s Private Law: Considerations on a Law 
of Justi(ce)-fication (justum facere) for the EU Multi-Level System, EUI Working Pa-
per Law No. 2003/3,: <http://www.iue.it/PUB/law03-3.pdf.>. 
39  Exemplified: Case 382/87, Buet v. Ministère Public, [1989] E.C.R. 1235; Case C-
361/89, Commission v. Di Pinto [1991] E.C.R. I-1189; Case C-183/00, Sanchez, 
cited above note 38; Case C-71/02, Karner v. Troostwijk, [2004] E.C.R. I-3025. 
40  Article 81(3) EC. Regulations: Reg. 1400/2002, Categories of Vertical Agreements 
and Concerted Practices in the Motor Vehicle Sector, (2002) O.J. L203/30; Reg. 
2790/1999, Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, (1999) O.J. 
L336/21; Reg. 772/2004, Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, (2004) 
O.J. L123/11; Reg. 2658/2000, Categories of Specialisation Agreements, (2000) O.J. 
L304/3; Reg. 2659/2000, Categories of R&D Agreements, (2000) O.J. L304/7; Reg. 
358/2003, Certain Categories of Agreements in the Insurance Sector, (2003) O.J. 
L53/8. 
41  Policy areas: Article 152 EC (health), Articles 174-176 EC (environment), Title VIII 
(employment), Article 157 EC (industrial policy), Title XVII (economic & social 
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outside the area of EC competence, national laws continue to apply, and na-
tional demarcations (i.e. between contract, tort and property) remain valid. Eu-
ropeanisation is, rather than being dominant, an aspect of what has been 
termed interlegality, of an intersection of legal orders.42 Thus, even in those 
areas where secondary law was passed uniform legal results were rare: EC 
harmonisation initiatives have always been accompanied by fragmentation. 
Thus, while regulations could fragment the law due to horse-trading in Coun-
cil, EC Directives established transposition frameworks which States trumped 
with upward derogation.43 Different approaches and transposition generated 
further inconsistencies between EC and national laws. At its extreme, mini-
mum harmonisation left the coherence of the law in a sorrier state than before 
the adoption of Community measures.44 Fragmentation in its international di-
mension was, in turn, exacerbated by the communitarisation of procedural 
law.45 At the same time lex mercatoria and arbitration, by which contracting 
parties sought to free themselves from national law, were gaining currency. 
These factors mean that polycentricity now dominates in cross-border trade. 
EC law, lex mercatoria, the UN Vienna Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods (CISG), the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT Principles, 2004) or the 1980 EC Rome 
Convention46 have become important sources of private law alongside national 
law. 
Given this fragmentation it is hardly surprising that calls for codification 
became popular, engendered by a variety of initiatives all of which were aimed 
at improving the EC regulatory environment.47 Yet an awareness that codifica-
                                                                                                                                                     
cohesion) and Title XVIII (R&D). C. Joerges & G. Brüggemeier, Europäisierung 
des Vertrags-und Haftungsrechts, cited above note 11, at 312-13. 
42  B. de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Towards a Post-Modern Concep-
tion of Law, (1987) 14 J.L.S. 279, 298: “Our legal life is constituted by an intersec-
tion of different legal orders… by interlegality.”  
43  Via minimum harmonisation, see Article 137 EC (social policy), Article 176 EC 
(environmental protection), EC Treaty Article 153(5) (consumer protection). 
44  Consumer Policy Strategy 2002-2006, (COM(2002) 208 final.) (7 May 2002) 
3.1.2.2. 
45  B. Heß, Die Integrationsfunktion des Europäischen Zivilverfahrensrechts, (2001) 21 
IPRax 389 at 395: ‘Disengaging Member States from Formulating Agencies’ initia-
tives.’ (author’s translation):  
46  CISG and UNIDROIT: http://www.unilex.info. Rome:  
http://www.rome-convention.org. 
47  White Paper on European Governance, (COM (2001) 428 final.), (2001) O.J. 
C287/1; SLIM Initiative, Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market, (COM(1996) 
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tion could also lead to fragmentation has arisen; the balance struck between 
liberalisation and regulation always lending the law a patchwork quality. For 
example, simply instituting a twenty-seventh framework of EC contract law 
for optional use in cross-border trade would increase fragmentation. Were a 
Code or an OI allowed to operate parallel to national law parties would be 
faced with a broader range of contract options. Furthermore, such parallel op-
eration would only work if a hierarchy were established between the regimes, 
which would preclude Member States from improving their own legislation! 
Finally, with intensified regulatory competition ad hoc approximation, or 
spontaneous harmonisation become more common, further undermining the 
case for codification.48 
C. Codes, conflicts and the International dimension 
A third parameter in assessing the potential future scope of Europeanised Pri-
vate law is supplied by practice in international trade, where three factors are 
increasingly influential. First, globalisation has generated new relationships 
between legal norms at a global as opposed to a regional level.49 Second, pow-
erful commercial forces support the trend to the ‘privatisation’ of international 
commercial law, to increasing resort to the lex mercatoria and arbitration.50 
Third, a countervailing trend can also be observed, raising questions concerning 
the extent of States’ legitimate interests.51 Yet we can go further, extrapolating 
an additional constellation of laws of justification between the national, regional 
and global levels, a constellation flanked by the on-going debate on the utility of 
                                                                                                                                                     
204 final.); Review of SLIM, COM (2000) 104 final; Simplifying and Improving the 
Regulatory Environment, (COM (2001) 726 final.). 
48  A.I. Ogus, Competition between National Legal Systems: a Contribution of Eco-
nomic Analysis to Comparative Law, (1999) 48 I.C.L.Q. 405; E. Kieninger, 
Wettbewerb der Privatrechtsordnungen im Europäischen Binnenmarkt, (Tübingen, 
Mohr Siebeck, 2002). 
49  G. Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems, 
(1997) 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 149, 159. 
50  Manifested in the new lex mercatoria: Y. Dezalay & B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue 
(Chicago, Chicago UP, 1996) at 83. Additionally: Privatisierung des Privatrechts – 
Rechtliche Gestaltung ohne staatlichen Zwang (C-H. Witt, M. Casper, et. al. eds., 
Jb.J.ZivRWiss.) (2002, Stuttgart, Boorberg, 2003). 
51  H. Muir Watt, Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A Matter of 
Political Economy, (2003) 9 C.J.E.L. 383, 385. The Community is endowed with le-
gal personality and may enter into international agreements: Articles 281 and 310 
(ex 210 and 238) EC. See Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263, 15-
19. 
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a Global Commercial Code.52 Here, while some have argued for a need to pri-
vatize conflicts’ law, to mediate  disputes with conflicts’ solutions, arbitration 
and the lex mercatoria, others have observed that, as economic actors continue 
to rely on national legal orders, there is a need to enhance national law to close 
the ‘regulatory gap’ in global trade and promote global welfare.53 
Could a ‘coherent’ body of Europeanised Private law make a significant 
contribution to this wider context of commercial cross-border transactions; re-
ducing transaction costs, increasing commercial parties’ confidence and acting 
as a spur to trade? Here it is important to note that, even today, in commercial 
cross-border contracts the European Principles of Contract law (PECL) may be 
chosen by the parties.54 In this sense the PECL can already influence commer-
cial practice. Again, Article 3 of the Rome Convention guarantees freedom of 
contract: economic actors cannot be required to contract in a particular way 
across borders! Thus the PECL will only be influential if they can prove their 
mettle in day-to-day contract practice. In contrast to the commercial contract, 
the PECL do not suit the cross-border consumer contract, because of the 
amount of mandatory law applicable to such transactions.55  
                                                 
52  While Basedow sees regionalisation as the harbinger of internationalisation, Farns-
worth assesses the chances of internationalisation as slim: J. Basedow, Worldwide 
Harmonisation of Private Law and Regional Economic Integration, (2003) 8 Unif. L. 
Rev. 31 at 36: ‘[I]ncreased demand for regional harmonisation… will generate inter-
regional conflicts… which can be accommodated by inter-regional harmonisation.’ 
E.A. Farnsworth, Modernisation and Harmonisation of Contract Law: an American 
Perspective, (2003) 8 Unif. L. Rev. 97 at 106: ‘[T]he… contract rules in such a code 
would consist virtually entirely of a collection of default rules that would be avail-
able to parties to commercial transactions that did not decide to reject or modify 
them.’ 
53  Respectively: M. Whincop & M. Keyes, Putting the ‘Private’ Back into Private In-
ternational Law: Default Rules and the Proper Law of the Contract, (1997) 21 Melb. 
U. L. Rev. 515, 542; R. Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The 
Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalisation, (2002) 
40 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 209, 264; H. Muir Watt, cited above note 44, at 400-01; 
and Dezalay & Garth, cited above note 43, at 313-14. 
54  The European Principles (PECL) allow for their application where the parties have 
either opted in or not chosen a law: Article 1:101 (3) PECL provides: ‘These Princi-
ples may be applied when the parties: (a) have agreed that their contract is to be 
governed by "general principles of law", the "lex mercatoria" or the like; or (b) have 
not chosen any system or rules of law to govern their contract.’ 
55  N. Reich, cited above note 6 at 7. Article 1:103 PECL on Mandatory Law provides: 
(1) Where the law otherwise applicable so allows, the parties may choose to have 
their contract governed by the Principles, with the effect that national mandatory 
rules are not applicable. (2) Effect should nevertheless be given to those mandatory 
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D. Party Autonomy & Facilitative Rules vs. Codifying Mandatory 
Rules 
More critically, if the protection of national identities is seen as a fundamental 
objective of integration, and the prevailing European identity is diverse, what 
reason is there for requiring a unified system of contract or private law? This 
proposition is supported by the fact that primary EC law presupposes the 
autonomy of contracting parties. Surely what the principle of contractual 
autonomy should really allow is that the parties themselves, rather than the 
Commission should be free to decide on the regulatory framework and con-
tents of their contract!56 In reality autonomy is brought to life by the facilita-
tive provisions of national contract law on consensus, on the effect of fraud, 
deception and misrepresentation, rules on non-performance, rules which are 
already reflected at the European and International levels in the non-
mandatory PECL or UNIDROIT principles. Private International law already 
provides coordinating mechanisms which respect party autonomy as far as 
possible, whether Rome Convention (Article 3) or CISG (Article 7). What 
business does the EU have in intervening in these processes by creating an ad-
ditional layer of facilitative law. In this vein, the Court of Justice has always 
underscored the freedom of contracting parties to determine the law applicable 
to their transactions.57 Drafting a common set of facilitative rules in the name 
of the internal market is therefore contrary to the thrust of freedom of contract. 
Thus, in accordance with the selective and piecemeal method European Con-
sumer law, and despite the proliferation of consumer directives, important as-
pects of the law are still left to the be resolved by reference to Member State 
law. Thus conclusion of the contract is not defined in EC secondary law so that 
withdrawal periods specified in consumer directives can only be interpreted in 
the light of national legal provisions. Similarly, individually negotiated terms 
are excluded from the application of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts with no Community clarification of the conditions in 
                                                                                                                                                     
rules of national, supranational and international law which, according to the rele-
vant rules of private international law, are applicable irrespective of the law govern-
ing the contract.  
56  N. Reich, cited above note 6, at 9: ‘Does autonomy not imply that the parties them-
selves choose the law they want to govern their contractual relationships? Do the 
fundamental freedoms as such not reveal a preference for a decentralised contract 
law? Protection can either be left to secondary EU legislation, or to conflict rules, or 
to a combination of both.’ 
57  Case C-339/89, Alsthom Atlantique [1991] ECR I-107 at 124: ‘the parties to an in-
ternational contract of sale are generally free to determine the law applicable to their 
contractual relations and can thus avoid being subject to French law.’ 
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which such negotiations will take place. 
In contrast, as we shift to mandatory law the picture changes. Especially in 
the area of consumer policy where, on the basis of Article 153(3) EC, meas-
ures pursuant to Article 95 may be adopted where they aid the completion of 
the internal market. Whilst mere divergence in national laws will not justify 
EC legislative intervention, the concern here is that an uneven playing-field of 
national consumer laws may well impede market integration. Here Article 
153(1) EC mandates a consumer policy predicated on supplying the consumer 
with information to promote his/her economic interests.58 This can be done in a 
variety of ways: through pre-contractual information requirements, rules gov-
erning pre-formulated terms and guarantees, via mandatory compensation 
rules. Whilst Tobacco Advertising questioned EU competence to legislate in 
contract and consumer law, the Court of Justice in Leitner ruled not only that 
the Community had jurisdiction to supply protection to package-tour holiday-
makers, but that the definition of compensation used in the Directive was to be 
lent an expansive interpretation to preclude distortions of competition.59 
E. Provisional conclusions 
This survey discloses some of the effects (harmonisation vs. fragmentation) 
and the complexity (interlegality vs. polycentricity) brought about by the in-
crease in cross-border trade.  It also underscores why the proponents of greater 
competition are at a disadvantage to proponents of codification (unitary vision 
vs. multiplicity). Rather than presenting an indisputable case, codification and 
coherence arguments inevitably result in porous legality. Thus whilst the rele-
vance and legitimacy of a broad exercise in codification can be questioned, 
important considerations speak for the selective consolidation of measures of 
EC secondary law. Yet the boundaries between these initiatives cannot be eas-
ily demarcated, and spillovers and further fragmentation will inevitably attend 
any exercise limited to consolidation. The question which then arises is 
whether consolidation will prove a springboard for codification.  
III. Policy Development 
In this section we review the stages of policy elaboration; from the 2001 Com-
munication and 2005 Progress Report to the current Parliament and Council 
                                                 
58  Article 153(1) EC. 
59  Case C-168/00, Simone Leitner [2002] E.C.R. I-2631. 
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positions, and the Commission’s latest Green Paper released on 8 February 
2007. 
A. The 2001 Communication 
The 2001 Communication60 disclosed the uncoordinated development and un-
even operation of EC Contract law, starting debate on the need to consolidate 
or at least review the contractually relevant EC directives on the basis of four 
options: 
• Option I: not to intervene but to rely on a competition of legal orders; 
• Option II: to develop non-binding principles inspired by Lando or 
UNIDROIT;  
• Option III: evaluation, improvement and consolidation of existing in-
struments; 
• Option IV: to introduce (a) new legal instrument(s) to consolidate the 
law. 
The 2001 Communication was criticised for being result-oriented. Under the 
guise of encouraging deliberation, the Commission’s preferences were pre-
sented alongside options which could be expediently ignored or withdrawn. 
B. The 2003 Action Plan 
Predictably, the 2003 Action Plan61 approved the 2001 Communication’s Op-
tions II-IV, rejecting Option I.  The Action Plan attempted to add new detail to 
each option: 
• CFR: this was the most important proposal. The CFR was to improve 
EC law by improving coherence on questions of transposition and inter-
pretation.62 A need was also identified for an overhaul and consolidation 
of concepts.63 It was also to identify special areas in which sectoral solu-
                                                 
60  2001 Communication on European Contract Law, (COM (2001) 398 final.) (13 Sep. 
2001); (2001) O.J. C 255/1. 
61  2003 Communication on a More Coherent European Contract Law - An Action 
Plan, (COM (2003) 68 final.) (15 Mar. 2003); (2003) O.J. C 63/1. D. Staudenmayer, 
The Commission Action Plan on European Contract Law, (2003) 11 E.R.P.L. 113. 
62  ibid. Action Plan draws attention to Leitner, cited above note 59. 
63  ibid. Action Plan at 32-36: CFR was to define terms and concepts frequently used in 
directives such as damage, conclusion, validity, non-performance, unjust enrich-
ment, representation of foreign companies, formal demands, exclusion or limitation 
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tions could be advanced.64 
• Standardisation: the intention to support the exchange of information 
on standard contract terms and to supply guidelines for their use.65  
• OI(s): the Commission aims at supplying greater horizontal coherence 
to EC Contract law.66  
The 2003 Action Plan contradicted itself; ostensibly retaining the vertical ap-
proach, while stressing the horizontal implications. This horizontal focus can 
be seen in the promotion of an overhaul of contract terms, in the advocacy of 
an examination of the interplay of contract and tort. At the same time, a range 
of questions were left unresolved: the form of the OIs (regulation, directive or 
recommendation); the relationship between the measures (CFR and OI(s)); the 
extent to which flexibility in the choice of law would still be available; and 
proportionality and legitimacy. Similarly, the liability and intellectual property 
issues attaching to the ‘best practice’ standard terms and conditions, as well as 
their availability in internal transactions, were issues left untouched.67 Some of 
this confusion can be explained: without a legal base the proposals could not 
be marketed as the harbinger of a Civil Code. Further, recalling the restrictions 
the Court of Justice had placed in Tobacco Advertising on the use of Article 95 
(ex 100a) EC as a legal base for measures to further the fundamental freedoms 
and preclude distortions of competition,68 the Commission was unlikely to be-
gin the exercise with an examination of the appropriate legal base.69 A more 
Machiavellian reason for the Commission’s strategy might be that policy iner-
tia invariably works to its advantage. 
C. The 2004 Communication 
A new circumspection entered the debate after publication of the Action Plan. 
Notably, Basedow appealed for gradualism: to initially develop the CFR as a 
basis for opt-in, sector-specific instruments, to then convert these into opt-out 
                                                                                                                                                     
of liability, etc. in order to avoid the inconsistencies that result from the divergent 
use of concepts in different directives. 
64  ibid. 30-31, 41-43, 47-50, 67Financial and insurance services, transfer and reserva-
tion of title, cabotage transport, factoring, consumer protection and tort law. 
65  ibid. at 21-23, 81-88.  
66  ibid. at 23-24, 89-97. 
67  ibid. at 21-23. 
68  Article 95. 1. cited above, note 14. 
69  Case C-376/98, Tobacco Advertising, 84 cited above note 15. 
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instruments, and, over 20-30 years, to extend them horizontally.70 The 2004 
Communication appears to subscribes to this: creating a three year (2005-7) 
research phase, followed by a drafting phase (2008-9) and culminating with 
adoption by 2009. The 2004 Communication fleshes out the structure of the 
CFR.71 The main points can be summarised: 
• CFR. Over half of the 2004 Communication is dedicated to mapping out 
the function, form, content and timeframe for the CFR.72 The CFR’s role 
is to improve the acquis by supplying definitions and model contract law 
rules.73 While the Study Group would have placed model rules in an an-
nex to a CFR, the Communication places them at the CFR’s centre.74 
One of the main tasks is to test the coherence of EC law, and, where apt, 
to codify the relevant framework. Here consumer protection is singled 
out as the potential object of codification. In its survey of the consumer 
acquis,75 the Communication highlights the need to combat differences 
arising from (1) disparate provisions of EC law; (2) disparities between 
national rules and EC law; (3) national measures of upward deroga-
                                                 
70  J. Basedow, Ein optimales Europäisches Vertragsgesetz – opt-in, opt-out, wozu ü-
berhaupt? (2004) 12 ZEUP 1 at 4: ‘To the extent that case-law was developed on the 
basis of this (opt-in) law, willingness to extend its application would grow… What 
is crucial is patience and planning extending beyond the next twenty or thirty years.’ 
(author's translation). 
71  2004 Communication, Cited above note 17, at 13; M. Schmidt-Kessel, Auf dem 
Weg zum Gemeinsamen Referenzrahmen, (2000) 2 GPR 2, 7. ‘The Commission has 
quite clearly underestimated the amount of preparatory work which needs to be un-
dertaken. In this regard it is of concern that the Principles of European Contract law, 
the core of the CFR, have, until now, barely been tested against the acquis.’ (author's 
translation). 
72  ibid. at 2-5, on functions and nature. Id. at 9-13, on preparation and elaboration. Id. 
at 14-16 on structure. 
73  ibid. at 3; id. at 11 ("principles and definitions … completed by model rules, form-
ing the bulk of the CFR"). 
74  ibid. at 3-4; M. Schmidt-Kessel, cited above note 71, at 4.  
75  ibid. at 3-4. Commission citing interplay of Directives: Directive 85/577/EEC Con-
tracts Negotiated Away from Business Premises (1985) O.J. L372/31; Directive 
90/314/EEC Package Tavel, Holidays and Tours (1990) O.J. L158/159; Directive 
94/47/EC Certain Aspects of Contracts Relating to the Purchase of the Right to Use 
Immovable Properties on a Timeshare Basis (1994) O.J. L280/47; Directive 97/7/EC 
Distance Contracts, (1997) O.J. L144/7; Directive 98/6/EC Indication of the Prices 
of Products Offered to Consumers (1998) O.J. L80/27; Directive 98/27/EC Injunc-
tions for the Protection of Consumers’ Interests (1998) O.J. L166/51; Directive 
99/44/EC Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guaran-
tees (1999) O.J. L171/12. 
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tion.76 The Commission suggests that acquis simplification will not be 
restricted to dealing with inconsistencies between directives; rather, a 
more horizontal approach is intended. Yet uncertainty is the hallmark of 
the proposals, the Commission raising a catalogue of questions rather 
than supplying hard-and-fast answers.77 In addition to consumer law, in-
surance contracts, contracts of sale and services, clauses relating to the 
retention and the transfer of title and late payments are identified as ar-
eas where harmonisation may be required. The Commission goes on to 
argue that the CFR will prove useful to arbitrators and in Commission 
practice.78 While stressing the need for analysis of the interaction of con-
tract and property law, the Commission concludes that there are no ap-
preciable problems arising from differences between contract and tort.79 
On the legal nature of the CFR, the Commission foresees the initial 
adoption of a non-binding instrument.  
• Standardisation: a need to supply guidelines to the relationship be-
tween standard terms and conditions and the EC competition rules and 
to identify further impediments to their use is identified.80 
• OI: the Commission acknowledged the instrument’s horizontal opera-
tion and attached parameters for evaluating the opportuneness of its 
adoption.81  
                                                 
76  M. Schmidt-Kessel, cited above note 71, at 4, upward derogation as a source of ob-
stacles: Case C-491/01, Ex Parte British American Tobacco (Investments) and Im-
perial Tobacco Ltd., [2002] E.C.R. I-11453. More recently: Case C-210/03, Swedish 
Match, cited above note 16. 
77  2004 Communication, Cited above note 17 at 4.  
78  ibid. respectively at 9 and 5-6. 
79  ibid. at 11; M. Schmidt-Kessel, cited above note 71, at 6; C. von Bar & U. Drobnig, 
The Interaction of Contract law and Tort and Property law in Europe (Munich: Sel-
lier, 2004).  
80  ibid. at 6-8. 
81  First, an impact assessment, especially with regard to the implications of the CFR, 
was to be conducted before any OI measures are adopted. Second, the binding na-
ture of the OI (opt-in or opt-out) was to be determined. Third, the legal form of the 
OI (regulation or recommendation) was to be decided. Fourth, the extent to which 
the OI was to be determined by the CFR was to be resolved. Fifth, the scope of the 
OI (B2B, B2C, mandatory provisions and interplay with the UN Vienna Convention 
(CISG)) required clarification. Sixth, further reflection on the legal base was re-
quired. 
 19
D. The 2005 Progress Report 
The 2003 Action Plan and the 2004 Communication were successful in direct-
ing European academic capacity into comparative legal studies. Significant 
research capacity has been contracted by the Commission, with the timetabling 
of final results for before 2009. Yet while the Commission displayed an un-
common clarity of purpose in staking out its initiative, the lead role assigned to 
the SGECC as well as participation in the study groups has been the object of 
criticism.82 More significantly, the precise status of the CFR remained unclear: 
was it meant to represent a ‘common core’ of EC contract law? Was it to be 
applicable solely to the cross-border, commercial contract? Or was it to extend 
into and unify the fabric of the divergent domestic contract law? How was it to 
relate to international instruments such as the CISG? Finally, the question of 
the basic lack of competence to pass the type of measures conceived of re-
mains unanswered. 
The 2005 Progress Report (Report) responded at least in part to this lack of 
clarity. It began by confirming the timetable for the CFR. It specified that the 
research phase be completed by the end of 2007. More fundamentally, the Re-
port stipulated that, rather than a grand design on the ‘common core’, the CFR 
was to be tested in the field of consumer protection.83 As far as Acquis Review 
is concerned, the Report focuses on the findings on transposition in the con-
sumer law areas covered by the ‘vertical’ Directives on Unit Pricing, Cross-
border Injunctions, Timesharing and Distance Selling. Here a need is identified 
to coordinate the measures with the more ‘behavioural’, horizontal directives, 
such as the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (Unit Pricing and Time-
sharing), and to tackle questions of uneven national transpositions (Unit Pric-
ing). Additionally, the Report advocates dealing with the phenomena of novel 
contracts and aggressive sales methods (Timesharing), and to more closely de-
fine the scope of individual consumer directives. In order to combat the par-
ticularism generated by sectoral legislation, a greater horizontal coherence – in 
particular in consumer protection law - in the adoption of measures needs to be 
developed.84 This combination of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ elements of the 
CFR is contentious; there being neither a policy nor a legal orientation appar-
                                                 
82  W. Hesselink, The Politics of a European Civil Code, (2004) 10 ELJ 675. 
83  See 2005 Progress Report, cited above note 18, at 2-6. 
84  Directive 98/6/EC, (unit pricing); Directive 98/27/EC, (cross-border injunctions); 
Directive 94/47/EC, (timesharing); Directive 97/7/EC, (distance selling) cited above 
note 75; Directive 2005/29/EC, Concerning Unfair Business to Consumer Commer-
cial Practices; see 2005 Progress Report, cited above note 18, at 7-9. 
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ent in the Commission’s position.85  
Beyond the Consumer Acquis-based CFR the Report adopts a more circum-
spect language and cautious approach. The Report announces that, due to run-
ning costs, unresolved liability issues, and the reluctance of economic actors to 
share ‘best practice’ solutions, a standardisation website will not be estab-
lished.86 As far as the elaboration of the ‘OI’ is concerned the Commission 
again withdraws; calling for ‘feasibility studies’ to be conducted. Finally, the 
Report points to the area of Financial services as one in which such an OI 
could prove to be opportune. 
E. 2006 Battle lines: Council vs. Parliament? 
The 2005 Progress Report’s findings were subsequently approved by the 
Council on 28-29 November 2005, which recognised the ‘unique opportunity 
afforded by the proposed review and the introduction of the Unfair Commer-
cial Practices Directive to update and modernise the consumer acquis.’ With 
greater emphasis the Council welcomed: ‘The Commission’s repeated reassur-
ance that it does not intend to propose a ‘European Civil Code’ which would 
harmonise contract laws of Member States, and that Member States’ differing 
legal traditions will be fully taken into account.’ The Council went on to em-
phasize the need to promote cross-border trade and to ensure a high degree of 
consumer protection. To these ends the Commission was invited ‘[t]o come 
forward as soon as possible with a timetable, a detailed description of the proc-
ess, and proposals for updating and modernizing the Consumer Acquis and 
also to reprioritize accordingly the work on the CFR.’87 This leaves the Com-
mission’s strategy resting on two initiatives: development of the CFR by the 
Joint Network, under the auspices of DG Health and Consumer Protection, and 
Acquis improvement by the Acquis Group, under the auspices of DG Internal 
Market.  
Not to be outdone, and certainly not to be outdone by the Council, the 
European Parliament has re-emphasised its commitment to codification and, in 
its resolution of 23 March 2006, reiterated: ‘its conviction, expressed in its 
resolutions of 26 May 1989, 6 May 1994, 15 November 2001 and 2 September 
2003, that a uniform internal market cannot be fully functional without further 
steps towards the harmonisation of civil law.’ The European Parliament went 
on to ‘(call) on the Commission to exploit straightaway the ongoing work by 
                                                 
85  N. Reich, cited above note 6, at 11. 
86  2005 Progress Report, cited above note 18, at 10-11. 
87  2694th Council Meeting cited above note 1, at 28-29. 
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the research groups on the drafting of European contract law, and by the Net-
work for a CFR, with a view to using their results firstly towards the revision 
of the acquis in the field of civil law, and subsequently towards developing a 
system of Community civil law.’88  
F. The 2006 Consumer law Compendium 
Thus the process of consumer protection-based Acquis modernisation, rather 
than codification, has the upper-hand in the moves towards EC private law 
consolidation. A convincing case can be made for a sectoral European regula-
tion in consumer protection. Moreover, such a measure, as Reich argues, could 
in theory be based on the legal base of Article 153 (3)(b) EC, and thus avoid-
ing the complexity of engaging internal market competence. The well-
developed area of mandatory European consumer protection, based on the in-
formation paradigm, could be codified with relative ease. Such a move could 
be justified on the basis of effectiveness; adoption of a Regulation avoiding the 
divergence introduced by measures of upward derogation and bypassing the 
problem of horizontal direct effect.89 The harmonisation measures as are likely 
to follow and the initial formulation of the CFR are to be based on the con-
sumer law provisions. Whilst the work of the joint network seems to have 
ground to a halt, the acquis group has produced the most wide-ranging re-
search: compiling a comprehensive compendium of the acquis and a compara-
tive analysis on its national implementation. On 18 December 2006 the Acquis 
Group presented its compendium of EC consumer law, which is now available 
from the Acquis Group and, via a link on the Commission’s website, alongside 
the compendium the Acquis Group has produced a 795 page comparative 
analysis (2006 Report).90  
G. 2007 Green Paper on the Consumer Acquis 
On 8 February 2007 the Commission presented its Green Paper on the Con-
sumer Acquis, a paper predating (COM (2006) 744 final) and hence notable 
                                                 
88  European Parliament Resolution cited above note 2. 
89  N. Reich, cited above note 6, at 33: ‘The Community should learn… that, in areas 
where protective standards are necessary and required by primary… law, such as 
Article 153 EC, the two-step procedure of adopting directives and then waiting for 
member state implementation before the consumer can invoke his/her rights, is sim-
ply insufficient.’  
90  http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/index_en.htm.  
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for failing to refer to the work of the Acquis Group (2007 Green Paper).91 The 
2007 Green Paper marks the opening of yet another round of consultation, fol-
lowing the 2001, 2003 and 2004 Communications and the 2005 Progress Re-
port. As the 2007 Green Paper does not make as much use of the 2006 Acquis 
Report as it might have a crucial opportunity for communication has been 
missed, lending some credence to the suspicion that the Commission has a 
very clear idea of the policy it wishes to pursue, and thus aims to orchestrate, 
rather than facilitate, debate by presenting a combination of its own pre-
approved positions and result-oriented questions.  
This in mind, it is striking, that the 2007 Green Paper mainly presents a 
catalogue of 31 further questions for stakeholders to answer; 19 of the 33 
pages of the 2007 Green Paper (Annex 1) are devoted to these questions. How-
ever, in many instances among the three options set to each question there can 
only be one correct answer and a clearly wrong answer is available in order to 
expedite policy discourse. Yet while appearing to encourage deliberation, the 
2007 Green Paper affirms the Commission’s role in the process, asserting that 
it is in the driving seat. The 2007 Green Paper can thus best be understood as 
an exercise in deliberate, rather than supranational, deliberation. The policy 
preference which emerges from this exercise is for the ‘mixed approach’ in-
volving a ‘horizontal instrument combined, where necessary, with vertical ac-
tion.’92 To the uninitiated this can be translated as: 
• A framework directive on EC Consumer Contract law (horizontal in-
strument) 
• Revision and improvement of the existing EC Consumer Directives 
(vertical action) 
Of the questions presented, a number are simply non-questions. For example, 
who could object to the harmonisation of cooling-off periods?93 Similarly, the 
question of whether the horizontal instrument should address only cross-border 
transactions is a non-question. The answer required of stakeholders is supplied 
by the Commission’s own analysis of the position. A horizontal approach re-
stricted to cross-border transactions would clearly not solve any of the issues 
arising from the revision of the Acquis but would increase the fragmentation 
between the legal orders (29th Regime) and the fragmentation between the ap-
                                                 
91  2007 Green Paper on the Consumer Acquis, (COM (2006) 744 final.) (08 Feb. 
2007) available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int. 
92  2007 Green Paper, cited above note 91, Option II, point 4.2 Option II: The mixed 
approach, page 8-9.  
93  2007 Green Paper, cited above note 91, Section 4.8.1. Harmonisation of the length 
of the cooling-off periods, Question F1, pages 20-21. 
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proaches taken by the different EC directives. This paper will not deal with this 
group of questions. Another group of questions are highly specialised. For ex-
ample, the question on the sales of second hand goods at public auctions94 or 
the question of whether a horizontal instrument should regulate the transfer-
ability of the commercial guarantee.95 More important are the remaining group 
of questions. Here focus is drawn to the three essential aspects of the 2007 
Green Paper: (1) the Commission’s concentration on the function of EC Con-
sumer law; (2) the role of freedom of contract in EC private law and the Com-
mission’s perception that freedom of contract; and (3) the case made for an 
asymmetric norm on good faith and fairness.  
IV. Evaluation 
A. Deliberate deliberation 
In this analysis the paradoxical nature of the Commission’s policy, the trunca-
tion of debate, the inertia relied upon and the potentially fragmentary effect of 
codification have emerged as striking features. Even more subtle has been the 
advent of the dual-track Joint Network/Acquis approach, especially striking is 
the more recent Commission centred upgrading of the acquis approach in the 
2007 Green Paper.  
The dangers associated with the Commission’s approach are attributable to 
its model of EC law and conception of the way in which legal orders interact. It 
should be recalled that, in the absence of a Treaty revision, Community institu-
tions are bound by their enumerated powers and contract law remains outside the 
scope of those powers.  Moreover, legal unity cannot be generated by uniform 
law, in fact, in a global environment we can expect diagonal conflicts to in-
crease. Furthermore, a whole range of principles of EU law are offended by the 
‘non-Code/Code/Acquis’ approach; subsidiarity and proportionality being recast 
as functional competences. The prognosis for the dual-track approach is unfa-
vourable. It attempts to coordinate the multi-level EU legal order, while ignoring 
the interlegality of norm production and clinging to an outdated hierarchical 
methodology. The ‘non-Code/Code’ suppresses debate on the project’s feasibil-
ity and evades focusing on the pragmatic development of a ‘restatement’-style 
European common law. The ease with which academic capacity has been di-
                                                 
94  ibid., Section 5.2. Second Hand Goods sold at public auctions, Question H2, at 
pp. 24-25. 
95  ibid., Section 5.10.2. The transferability of the commercial guarantee, Question M2, 
at p. 31. 
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rected towards serving this contentious goal is striking, especially given that 
even the simplest questions await resolution: why should parties select an opt-in 
instrument? Can freedom of contract be squared with an opt-out instrument? 
Can a Code be more efficient than spontaneous harmonisation? 
In fact the initiative appears more questionable from stage to stage. The 
Council approved the CFR (4-5 November 2004) before the national experts (3 
December 2004) and the CFR-Net (15 December 2004) had met. All these 
steps predated the establishment of the Joint Network, charged with fleshing 
out proposals which had already been approved by the Council. That the 
Commission then gazumps the 2006 Acquis Report with its own 2007 Green 
Paper on Acquis review rounds off this picture of Byzantine governance and 
can be interpreted as a reaction to the impossibility of the dual-track approach.  
The double paradox here is that – regardless of the extent of any written in-
struments as may be adopted – case-law and compatibility rules will, in any 
event, assume an ever greater importance and eclipse the role of written law. 
As Amstutz anticipates, this will lead to rearrangements in the Continental ap-
proach to law, yet ultimately also, as Farnsworth observes, to a rearrangement 
of the Common law approach to EC private and contract law.96  
B. Further Fragmentation 
Though many features of the Commission’s proposals remain unspecified,97 
other options, such as measures of differentiated integration, have yet to be 
debated. Clearly, if harmonisation has produced fragmentation so far, there is 
little reason to suppose that mandatory or voluntary harmonisation will halt 
this trend. Furthermore, depending on the choices made, a unique pattern will 
be injected into what will remain patchwork law. Different patchworks and 
patterns, though passed in the name of legal unity, produce unique cleavages in 
                                                 
96  M. Amstutz, Zwischenwelten. Zur Emergenz einer interlegalen Rechtsmethodik im 
europäischen Privatrecht, in Rechtsverfassungsrecht, cited above note 38, at 237: 
‘much will depend on whether national legal approaches will open themselves to the 
evolutionary logic of relational strategy behind the Marleasing case-law. This in 
turn will depend on fundamental rearrangements in continental legal methodology 
which, even to this day… places written law at the center of its operations.’ (au-
thor’s translation). M. Amstutz, In-between Worlds, (2005) E.L.J. 766-784. E.A. 
Farnsworth, cited above note 52 at 99-100 ‘The UCC, along with our Restatements, 
has given us a system of common law that seems less startlingly different from Con-
tinental European legal systems than does English Common law.’ 
97  Inter alia as to whether they will adopt an opt-in or opt-out form, whether the meas-
ures will apply purely to the context of cross-border trade, or extend to domestic sit-
uations. 
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polycentric private law. Finally, the contention that coherence can be achieved 
through the vertical approach, or the adoption of a ‘twenty-seventh’ layer of 
opt-in private law can be disputed. It could be suggested that the real function 
of the CFR and the OI has nothing to do with the integrity of the vertical ap-
proach. In fact, it seems that the opposite is sought: CFR and OI are to act as 
catalysts forcing ever broader codification and rendering a full-blown Code 
inevitable. Seen in this light the bifurcation of initiatives between codification 
on the one hand (joint network/DG Health and Consumer Protection) and im-
proving the acquis on the other (Acquis Group/DG Internal Market) can be un-
derstood as a pragmatic response to the Council’s reaction and broader criti-
cism of codification.98  
C. Deliberative Supranationalism vs. Deliberate Deliberation 
Faced with politicised law, the case for deliberative supranantionalism to ad-
dress the legitimacy problems of integration has long been advanced. This in-
volves using the law as ‘an organizer and supervisor of processes’,99 adopting 
a conflicts approach to the interfaces of EU/national law. This approach relies 
on the parties, rather than the law-makers, on case-law rather than written law; 
on non-legislative harmonisation.100 This challenges the supremacy of EU law: 
‘Supremacy is not properly understood if it is ascribed to some transnational 
body of law. European law requires the identification of rules and principles to 
ensure the co-existence of different constituencies’ objectives with the com-
mon concerns they share.’101 This idea of Europeanisation as a process charged 
with the supervision of power needs to be developed. Arguably, the only way 
to ensure good governance depends on the transparency and quality of deci-
sion-making processes. Set in these terms, full-blown codification is question-
able; it fails to respect diversity and assigns mistaken roles to legislation and 
the courts.  
A major issue associated with supremacy is the question of the extent of the 
EC’s powers. The Commission has bypassed this question as if it possessed a 
‘residual’ law-making capacity; consideration of the legal base being the very 
                                                 
98 P. Legrand, Antivonbar, (2006) 1 J.C.L. 13. 
99  C. Joerges, European Law’s Supremacy, cited above note 38, at 8-9 and 12; C. Joer-
ges, Der Europäisierungsprozess als Herausforderung des Privatrechts: Plädoyer für 
eine neue Rechts-Disziplin, ZERP-Diskussionspapier 2006/1. 
100  A. Colombi Ciacchi, Non-legislative Harmonisation of Private law under the Euro-
pean Constitution: The Case of Unfair Suretyships, (2005) 3 E.R.P.L. 285. 
101  C. Joerges, Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy, cited above note 38, at 18. 
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last point of Annex II of the 2004 Communication.102 Similarly, proportionality 
concerns refer us back to the communitarisation of procedural law, which was 
all that the majority of economic actors ever wanted. Here the question is 
whether it is enough to ensure a framework for judicial cross-border coopera-
tion rather than extensive codification.103 Both deliberative supranationalism 
and codification can thus be seen as problematic from the perspective of com-
petence. Is deliberative supranationalism anything more than a ragged descrip-
tion of the modern trend towards increasingly informal, ad hoc and disorgan-
ised decision-making? Could such intentional deliberation simply be aimed at 
obscuring the true extent of the democratic deficit. Notwithstanding the cave-
ats to such deliberation, is anything substantial to be gained by substituting 
deliberation with unitary law? Ultimately, both approaches detract from the 
integrity of integration. In the context of protecting diversity minimum har-
monisation was more than a means by which unanimity in Council could be 
avoided: it represented a compromise between integration, wider policy and 
respecting national identities. 
D. Path dependency of European Private law 
The relationship between fragmentation, competition and harmonisation 
should be illuminated before further steps are undertaken. Even the measure of 
consolidation achieved by spontaneous harmonisation can be disputed, sponta-
neous harmonisation being effective only in those narrow areas of functional 
similarity across legal systems. More generally, spontaneous harmonisation 
can lead to the broader diffusion of legal irritants. Yet beyond this lies the 
more pragmatic idea of non-legislative harmonisation; that case-law conver-
                                                 
102  Commission observes 2004 Communication, Cited above note 17 at 21: ‘very few 
contributors expressed their view on that issue.’ 
103  Measures europeanising procedure: Reg. 44/2001/EC, (2001) O.J. L12/1, on juris-
diction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
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Procedure, (COM (2004) 173 final.). 
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gence could obviate the need for horizontal legislative measures.104 Clearly the 
adoption of legislative measures would require a Treaty revision to allow the 
Commission to proceed.105 At the same time, EC institutions are charged with 
making the case for each initiative as it is adopted. The acid test is whether the 
institutions can finesse their enumerated powers by packaging codification in 
market-integration language.  
The path dependency of the Commission’s vision of private law is a topic 
which also needs further analysis. The model behind the plan is based on the 
German model of legal and political integration. Predictably, the Commission 
officials charged with developing the CFR, the Joint Network, the Study 
Group and CFR-Net are dominated by German academics and lawyers. There-
fore, rather than being able to influence the process in any fundamental way, 
the task for lawyers in the coming years will be to critically evaluate the proc-
ess, the specific proposals and concrete steps taken towards the Civil Code. 
Here, the coherence of CFR/Acquis improvement proposals and their effect on 
the law in action will require field-by-field analysis. Meanwhile, the cross-
jurisdictional equivalence of legal instruments and the practical application of 
the law needs attention to ensure that codification does not simply produce an 
ever greater fragmentation of the law. 
Regardless of the final shape of the Joint Network/Acquis improvement 
proposals, under no circumstances should the mere prospect of codification 
work to compromise or frustrate national initiatives aimed at simplifying and 
consolidating the law. In particular, as the very idea codification tends to rele-
gate Common law to the sidelines, the more pragmatic Common law method-
ology should inform the debate in a much more significant way than has been 
the case until now.106 Similarly, the project should at its outer limit be limited 
to the drafting of opt-in OIs for homogenous legal products in cross-border 
consumer transactions. Finally, the position of practitioners and the signifi-
cance of case-law need to be better recognised in any legislative measures 
adopted on the basis on the CFR. 
                                                 
104  A. Colombi Ciacchi, cited above note 100. 
105  S. Weatherill, cited above 10at 12 commenting on Tobacco Advertising: ‘the demise 
of the political assumption that the EC possesses a competence carte blanche to har-
monize laws may clear the way to a more explicit and constructive focus on what 
really is needed of a programme of harmonisation in the modern European Union... 
the context has altered. Centralisation is under fire. Harmonisation has become a 
more constitutionally contested process.’ 
106  P. Legrand, Antivonbar, (2006) 1 JCL 13 at 24: ‘the way in which the common law 
actualises itself in an authentic manner is to be destroyed in the name of the rule of 
technology...’ 
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E. The Current Options 
The current options towards greater coherence and the harmonisation of civil 
law can be elaborated from the latest stages of policy formulation and the reac-
tions and objections to the proposals tabled so far. We can group the current 
options in three types of measure: soft measures, sector-specific measures and 
horizontal measures. Again the measures can take a number of legal forms:  
Soft measures 
• Open Method of Coordination (OMC): in areas such as the creation of a 
Code of Private law where the EC has no competence, one obvious way 
to proceed is through soft law measures. OMC measures are based on 
Article 127 or 140 EC, which allow the Commission to encourage coop-
eration between the Member States.107 
• Recommendation to observe the European Principles (PECL): as alluded 
to above, the PECL are likely to play an influential role in the consolida-
tion process. As has also been observed, the PECL are freely electable in 
any case to contracting parties in cross-border transactions. Here the 
Commission could consider passing a Recommendation under Article 
211 (ex 155) EC to encourage contracting parties to make use of the 
PECL.  
Sector specific measures: 
• Consumer-acquis improvement: piecemeal measures in particular policy 
fields to improve the acquis (i.e. in consumer law) vindicating a bottom-
up approach to the initiative which begins with the existing secondary 
law promoting coherence in mandatory areas of EC consumer law (pre-
contractual information, withdrawal rights, terms governing unfair terms 
and guarantees, rules on compensation and warranties.) 
• Consumer Contract Regulation: a Regulation based on Article 153 (3) 
(b) EC, rather than the contentious internal market competence, and 
codifying the relatively sophisticated and essential general principles of 
EC consumer protection (information paradigm) requiring codifica-
tion.108 Resort to a Regulation could be justified on the grounds that di-
rectives have been unevenly transposed and, in the absence of horizontal 
                                                 
107  Article 140(2) EC specifies that the Commission ‘act in close contact with the Mem-
ber States by making studies, delivering opinions and delivering opinions and ar-
ranging consultations both on problems arising at national level and on those of con-
cern to international organisations.’ 
108  N. Reich, cited above note 6 at 31 cites specific rules on ‘cooling-off’ periods in 
direct and distance marketing, unfair terms and legitimate quality expectations. 
 29
direct effect, have proved of limited utility to the plaintiff. Measures 
passed, under Article 153(5) EC, would be of minimum harmonisation 
and allow for Member State upward derogation.  
• Asymmetric Consumer Contract framework instrument on good faith 
(2007 Green Paper): in the 2007 Green Paper the Commission appears 
to suggest adoption of a behavioural, asymmetric ‘good faith’ directive 
to be adopted for the benefit of the active EC  consumer to the cost of 
business.   
• Symmetric Consumer Contract framework instrument on good faith 
(2007 Green Paper): indirectly, the Commission invites debate, by pro-
moting adoption of an asymmetric good faith standard, of a more objec-
tive and balanced norm; a symmetric good faith norm has much too rec-
ommend it.  
• Selective vertical action (2007 Green Paper) 
Horizontal measures: OI, CFR and Code 
• Common core, cross-border, facultative CFR: Elaborating a CFR across 
a common core of contract law (contracts of sale, services and security 
interests) from best solutions drawn from the acquis, international in-
struments such as the 1980 Vienna Convention (CISG): laying down 
fundamental principles, key concepts and model rules, applicable to 
cross-border commercial transactions. 
• A cross-border and domestically applicable CFR: intended to replace or 
supplement national laws. 
• OI-Regulation(?) on common contract rules: broader formulation of 
more horizontally applicable rules (i.e. consumer and some commercial 
contracts) cast in the form of an opt-in OI (i.e. rules on contract forma-
tion), developing common characteristics from a number of directives, 
discarding the contradictions and consolidating the remedies.109  Ac-
cording to the 2003 Action Plan this OI could be elaborated from the 
CFR, explicitly in the field of financial services, insurance and savings’ 
products. An OI-Regulation could be passed on the basis of Article 308 
EC.  
European Civil Code 
• Comprehensive codification: comprehensive codification is a longer-
term option which depends on a Treaty revision to expand Community 
competences. A Code of European Private law would displace the tradi-
                                                 
109  R. Schulze, Grundsätze des Vertragsschlusses im Acquis Communautaire (2005) 
G.P.R. 52. 
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tionally national, facilitative rules on establishing consensus between the 
parties (i.e. rules on the meeting of the minds, cancellation rights, fraud, 
misrepresentation and deception, remedies in the case of non-
performance).   
F. Marking the Commission’s Cards 
The objections to these measures become more intense the more they tend to-
wards comprehensive measures of codification; at its inner limit, consumer-
Acquis formulation offending Tobacco Advertising, though within the scope of 
Leitner; at is outer limit comprehensive codification offending the heterogene-
ous nature of sui generic, functional EC private law and the principle of sub-
sidiarity.110 Many of the options would barely justify the level of resources go-
ing into their elaboration. Passing a Recommendation encouraging contracting 
parties to observe PECL principles on an opt-in basis, for example, would rep-
resent a lowest common denominator solution, falling far short of the Commis-
sion strategy. Additionally, such a recommendation would not bring the con-
tract within the purview of the European Court of Justice, PECL not being an 
Act of the EU under Article 234 EC. 
Caution counsels against the more concrete measures of horizontal codifi-
cation, at the most a case for improving the law’s coherence can be made on a 
sector-by-sector basis, and most obviously in the area of mandatory EC Con-
sumer law. Here a measure of consolidation recommends itself: a consolida-
tion of mandatory consumer protection law on the basis of minimum harmoni-
sation. Conversely, there is the ubiquitous suspicion that the emergence of 
such a weak measure is not what the Commission has in mind as a fitting fi-
nale. Furthermore, were a Treaty revision possible, and a comprehensive codi-
fication to be the end result, the next problem would be the ability of the Court 
of Justice to interpret a new and expansive body of law with binding force in 
the Member States. The current indication is that the Court of Justice would 
resist any invitation to once again don the mantle of judicial activism in the 
name of EC Private law integration.111    
Recent developments suggest that the character of the emergent initiative is 
far from settled. Emblematic of the confusion surrounding the initiative is the 
contested status of consumer law, leaving even the initiative’s erstwhile chief 
architect in a quandary as to whether consumer law can be included in an OI, 
                                                 
110  Article 5 EC. 
111  Case C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten [2004] ECR I-3403.  
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or serve as the centrepiece of the CFR.112 Due to appear in March 2008, the 
CFR will serve less as an embryonic Civil Code but, rather, function as a ‘tool 
box’ from which the Commission may draw as it chooses. The Joint Network, 
with its impressive expertise on comparative law, is now ignominiously rele-
gated to the task of gathering in and preparing the Commission’s tools.  
The 2007 Green Paper represents the third stage in a process aimed at im-
proving the coherence of EC private law. As the Commission concludes the 
steadily expanding body of selective, haphazard, contradictory, uneven, di-
versely drafted and transposed EC secondary law has caused significant legal 
fragmentation. The Community has always instrumentalised contract as a sim-
ple means to complex policy ends: using contract law to achieve goals in com-
petition, free movement, consumer protection, public procurement and non-
discrimination. European Contract law is thus a functional rather than system-
atic body of law, developed piecemeal from the bottom-up to solve practical 
problems, rather than from the top down to create a coherent body of general 
law.113 Set against this background the case for greater coherence in EC private 
law is vital.114  
The framework directive is the most obvious and appropriate measure for 
the Commission’s goals. That the emergent framework instrument pursues a 
clear, comprehensive and consistent approach, rather than repeating the mis-
takes of the past, is of central importance. Above all EC private law should not 
be mixed up with provisions and goals taken from other fields of law, freedom 
of contract should not be suppressed, while the instrument should not define 
hundreds of duties to inform which only ruin contractual transparency. The 
framework directive will only advance the cause of EC Consumer law if it 
meets these requirements.  
A final question emerges from the ‘greater coherence’ initiative: is Europe 
ready for a paradigm shift with a radically new approach in EC Consumer law; 
laying a new emphasis on social justice? No matter how desirable such a shift 
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may appear, the current state of EC law would not allow such a move: the 
Commission has neither the legislative competence nor the administrative ca-
pacity for such a departure.  
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